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The facts leading up to Garcia v. Google (Garcia I),1 a Ninth 
Circuit case reheard en banc (Garcia II),2 were just as strange as 
the effects of the original ruling. A casting call had been posted on-
line for a film described as a “historical desert drama set in the 
Middle East”3 about a man named George and his gang of war-
riors.4 It was not until after the video was posted on YouTube, did 
the actors learn the true significance of the film. The film ended up 
being a fourteen minute anti-Islamic trailer, portraying the prophet 
Muhammad as a womanizer, pedophile, and murderer.5 
The filmmaker intentionally deceived the actors.6 He caused 
them emotional distress and even invaded the actors’ privacy.7 Ul-
timately, one of the actors, Cindy Lee Garcia, and her attorney re-
lied on a copyright claim in federal court to seek a motion for a pre-
                                                                                                                            
1 Garcia v. Google (Garcia I), 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 
(9th Cir. 2015). 
2 See Garcia v. Google (Garcia II), 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
3 Adrian Chen, “It Makes Me Sick”: Actress in Muhammed Movie Says She Was 
Deceived, Had No Idea It Was About Islam, GAWKER (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:29 PM), 
http://gawker.com/5942748/it-makes-me-sick-actress-in-muhammed-movie-says-she-
was-deceived-had-no-idea-it-was-about-islam [http://perma.cc/482F-E9CB]. 
4 See Michael Joseph Gross, Disaster Movie, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 27, 2012, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2012/12/making-of-innocence-of-muslims 
[http://perma.cc/M2H6-7Z35]. 
5 See id. 
6 Serge F. Kovaleski & Brooks Barnes, From Man Who Insulted Muhammad, No Regret, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/us/from-the-man-
who-insulted-islam-no-retreat.html [http://perma.cc/DJ3D-74DM]. 
7 Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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liminary injunction to have Google remove the film from You-
Tube.8 
However, although Garcia had suffered harm, such as receiving 
death threats,9 the harms she had suffered cannot be appropriately 
remedied by copyright law. “Although we do not take lightly 
threats to life or the emotional turmoil Garcia has endured, her 
harms are untethered from—and incompatible with—copyright 
and copyright’s function as the engine of expression.”10 Authors 
cannot seek claims for emotional distress, defamation, or privacy 
by filing claims under copyright law.11 
“Privacy laws, not copyright, may offer remedies tailored to 
Garcia’s personal and reputational harms.”12 Plaintiffs have at-
tempted to use copyright law to resolve their issues, where privacy 
law would offer the best and most appropriate remedy to their 
harm. For example, there are individuals who want photos re-
moved from websites because they have suffered privacy harms or 
they have suffered emotional distress. These individuals may at-
tempt to use copyright law to have the photos removed, even 
though they have not suffered any harm related to the infringement 
of their copyright. 
This Note will investigate how individuals attempt to use copy-
right law, instead of seeking damages for emotional distress or pri-
vacy, by using Garcia I and Garcia II as examples. Part I will pro-
vide background on Garcia I and Garcia II, the facts leading up to 
the lawsuit, the first decision and the criticism surrounding it, and 
the second decision. Part II will discuss what other legal methods 
Garcia may have used to achieve the same result and potentially 
obtain the same relief if she decided not to sue for copyright in-
fringement. Part III will look beyond Garcia I and Garcia II at other 
types of situations where plaintiffs feel their best legal strategy is to 
sue for copyright infringement, even though their suits are more 
akin to defamation or privacy lawsuits, as a result of the protections 
for online hosts created by the Communications Decency Act. 
                                                                                                                            
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 932–33. 
10 Garcia II, 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
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I. GARCIA V. GOOGLE 
A. Background Facts 
In 2011, Cindy Lee Garcia was featured in the film Desert War-
rior for five minutes; a film she and her co-actors believed would be 
an Arabian “action-adventure movie.”13 Prior to shooting the film, 
she received only four pages of script and roughly $500 from the 
film’s screenwriter and producer, who referred to himself as Sam 
Bacile (real name Mark Basseley Youssef).14 
It was only after the video had been posted on YouTube that 
the actors learned what Youssef had done and, as a result, how 
strongly the Islamic community had reacted to the newly titled In-
nocence of Muslims. Youssef had partially dubbed over the actors’ 
lines, making it appear as though Garcia was asking, “Is your Mo-
hammed a child molester?”15 The film had been described as 
“clearly designed to offend Muslims, portraying Mohammed as a 
bloodthirsty murderer and Lothario and pedophile with omnidirec-
tional sexual appetites.”16 Youssef admitted to creating the film as 
an open expression of his hatred of Islam and intentionally tricking 
the actors to help him create it.17 
In 2012, an Egyptian cleric used a clip of the film on his televi-
sion show sparking outrage and protests in Cairo.18 The protests 
spread to Yemen, Morocco, Iran, Tunisia, Sudan, Iraq, Pakistan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Indonesia, and Malaysia.19 Those involved with 
the film received death threats and went into hiding.20 Garcia also 
                                                                                                                            
13 See Gross, supra note 4. 
14 See Gross, supra note 4. Youssef goes by several names, including his birth name 
Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, but the Ninth Circuit uses Youssef. See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 
932. 
15 See id. 
16 Gross, supra note 4. 
17 See Kovaleski & Barnes, supra note 6. 
18 David D. Kirkpatrick, A Deadly Mix in Benghazi, Chapter 4: A Fuse Is Lit, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=3 
[http://perma.cc/ZE4F-R2CB]. 
19 Id. 
20 See Gross, supra note 4. 
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claims she was made the subject of the cleric’s fatwa “against any-
one associated with Innocence of Muslims.”21 
Garcia filed several Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”)22 takedown notices, which Google resisted.23 In Sep-
tember 2012, Garcia brought suit against Youssef and Google seek-
ing a restraining order, which would require Google to remove In-
nocence of Muslims from YouTube.24 The district court denied her 
request for a preliminary injunction because Garcia had delayed in 
bringing the action.25 The district court also found that Garcia had 
not established a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim 
because she is not considered an “author” under the Copyright 
Act and precedent,26 and, even if she did own a copyright interest 
in her own performance, she had granted the film’s author implied 
consent to use the performance.27 Garcia ultimately appealed the 
preliminary injunction ruling to the Ninth Circuit.28 
B. Garcia I 
On appeal, Judge Alex Kozinski, writing for a two-to-one ma-
jority, issued an order granting Garcia’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction. The court’s decision addressed three points: whether 
Garcia could retain a copyrightable interest in her performance, 
whether she had granted an implied license to Youssef to use her 
performance, and whether she is likely to show irreparable harm. 
1. Garcia Has a Copyrightable Interest 
In ordering Google to take the film down, the Ninth Circuit 
held that Garcia’s performance is independently copyrightable.29 
                                                                                                                            
21 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 10, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-
57302). 
22 See infra Part II.B. for a discussion on DMCA takedown notices. 
23 Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 932. 
24 See id. 
25 Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, Garcia v. Nakoula, 
No. 12-cv-08315-MWF-VBK (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012). 
26 See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000); see also infra 
Part I.B. 
27 See Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 25, at 3. 
28 Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929. 
29 See id. at 940; see also Rebecca Tushnet, My Long, Sad Garcia v. Google Blog Post, 
REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (Mar. 17, 2014), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2014/03/ 
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Judge Kozinski found that Garcia could retain a copyrightable in-
terest in her own contribution to the film. Garcia admitted that she 
was not a joint author.30 However, the court concluded that she 
could still be an author in her own performance, even if she is not a 
joint author of the whole film.31 The majority held that her contri-
bution was sufficient to make her an author of her own perfor-
mance because an actor does more than simply speak the words on 
a page.32 Otherwise, Judge Kozinski wrote, “every shmuck . . . is an 
actor because everyone . . . knows how to read.”33 He wrote that it 
did not matter that Youssef had written the dialogue, managed all 
aspects of the production, and later dubbed over a portion of her 
scene.34 The majority also noted that Garcia does not own an inter-
est in the entire scene, just her contribution, albeit minor.35 The 
court concluded that an individual could still make a copyrightable 
contribution and not become a joint author of the whole work.36 
In opposition, the dissent asserted that the majority erred in 
holding that Garcia has a copyright interest in her performance.37 
The dissent argued Garcia’s performance is not protected under 
the Copyright Act because (1) it is not a “work,” (2) she is not an 
author, and (3) the performance is too personal to be fixed.38 Addi-
tionally, it stated that Garcia’s claim is better characterized as one 
of a joint work.39 The dissent wrote that, as Garcia was not the ori-
                                                                                                                            
my-long-sad-garcia-v-google-post.html [http://perma.cc/HFE5-R9WV] (providing 
further analysis on the holding of Garcia). 
30 See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 933. 
31 See id. at 933–34. 
32 See id. at 934. 
33 See id. at 934 (quoting SANFORD MEISNER & DENNIS LONGWELL, SANFORD MEISNER 
ON ACTING 178 (1987)). 
34 See id. 
35 See id. at 935. 
36 See id. at 934. 
37 See id. at 941 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
38 See id. 
39 See id. at 942–44. The dissent uses Aalmuhammed v. Lee to show that Garcia does not 
qualify as an author because her contribution was minimal and she was not the originator 
of the ideas or concepts. See id. In Aalmuhammed, the Ninth Circuit rejected a 
consultant’s claim of co-authorship of a joint work because his contributions to the film, 
although valuable, were not enough for co-authorship. See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 
F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000). The court said that to be an author “requires more than a 
minimal creative or original contribution to the work.” See id. (quoting Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1883)). However, the majority ultimately 
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ginator of the ideas or concepts (she simply acted them out), she is 
not the author.40 
2. Implied License 
Additionally, the court found that Garcia had granted an im-
plied license to Youssef to use her performance in the film.41 The 
majority held that implied licenses must be construed broadly, oth-
erwise actors would possess an excessive amount of control over 
the films they starred in, especially if the film failed to meet the ac-
tor’s “ex ante expectations.”42 However, the court found that an 
implied license is not unlimited.43 Judge Kozinski wrote that Yous-
sef exceeded the bounds of the license through his deceit and lies.44 
Further, “[t]he film differs so radically from anything Garcia could 
have imagined when she was cast that it can’t possibly be autho-
rized by any implied license she granted Youssef.”45 Therefore, 
Innocence of Muslims itself is an infringing use of the implied li-
cense.46 
3. Irreparable Harm and Injunctions 
The majority discussed the finding of irreparable harm through 
both the damage to Garcia’s reputation and through the death 
threats she received.47 It is possible for “unreasonable delay [to] 
defeat irreparable injury.”48 The court found that even though 
Garcia took action only when she began to receive death threats, 
                                                                                                                            
found that Aalmuhammed did not apply here because the case was about joint authorship 
over an entire work. See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 934. The court concluded that an individual 
could still make a copyrightable contribution and not become a joint author of the work in 
its entirety. See id. 
40 See id. at 943 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
41 See id. at 937 (majority opinion). 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. at 938. 
47 See id. at 938–39. 
48 See Garcia II, 786 F.3d 733, 734 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[A][3][c] (2002)). 
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and not earlier when she first discovered the video,49 her actions 
were still reasonable and the issuing of an order to remove the film 
from YouTube would have enough of an effect on the death threats 
Garcia received to justify the injunction.50 The court stated that: 
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 
show that: (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits, 
(2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the ab-
sence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equi-
ties tips in her favor, and (4) an injunction is in the 
public interest.51 
Here, the majority found a likelihood of success on the merits 
(Garcia’s performance gives her a claim in copyright) and it found 
she suffered some irreparable harm. Accordingly, the court di-
rected Google to “take down all copies of Innocence of Muslims from 
YouTube and any other platforms within its control and to take all 
reasonable steps to prevent further uploads.”52 
The dissent reminded the court that mandatory injunctions are 
particularly disfavored and should be subject to a higher degree of 
scrutiny.53 As “Garcia seeks a mandatory injunction, she must es-
tablish that the law and facts clearly favor her position, not simply 
that she is likely to succeed.”54 The dissent also disagreed with the 
majority and found that since Garcia delayed in bringing suit, she 
had not demonstrated how she would continue to suffer irreparable 
harm.55 
Last, the dissent included a discussion on balancing the equi-
ties.56 The dissent argued that the balancing of the equities does 
not favor Garcia. It wrote that the injunction burdens Google, who 
is not a party to Youssef’s actions, and it burdens free expression, 
                                                                                                                            
49 See id. (“Garcia waited months to seek an injunction after Innocence of Muslims was 
uploaded to YouTube in July 2012; she did not seek emergency relief when the film first 
surfaced on the Internet.”). 
50 See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 938–39. 
51 Garcia II, 786 F.3d at 740; Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). 
52 See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 940. 
53 See id. at 940 (quoting Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
54 See Garcia II, 786 F.3d at 740. 
55 See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 947 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
56 See id. at 948. 
2016] USING COPYRIGHT TO REMOVE CONTENT 471 
 
whereas, Garcia’s copyright interest is not guaranteed, but rather 
“potential.”57 Therefore, the dissent concluded that there was no 
abuse of discretion in the district court holding that Garcia would 
not likely succeed on the merits of her claim and should not be 
granted a preliminary mandatory injunction.58 
4. Amended Opinion 
On July 11th, 2014, the court filed an amended opinion,59 add-
ing deliberations on the Copyright Office’s refusal to register Gar-
cia’s copyright60 and addressing the lack of discussion of any fair 
use defense.61 The Copyright Office refused Garcia’s application to 
register a copyright in her own performance and stated that actor’s 
performances in motion pictures are a part of the motion picture 
and not a separable claim. The court also added that the majority 
opinion did not preclude the district court from finding that Garcia 
does not have a copyrightable interest in her performance on re-
mand.62 The dissent amended its opinion, as well, expanding its 
discussion to include first amendment concerns.63 
C. Criticism of Garcia I 
Judge Kozinski’s majority opinion in Garcia I attracted intense 
criticism, primarily on his interpretation of Garcia’s copyright in-
terest.64 Most criticism resulted from the worry that third-party 
                                                                                                                            
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 949. 
59 Order and Amended Opinion, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302). The dissent 
also amended its opinion, albeit minimally. 
60 See Brief of Defendants-Appellees at Addendum 46, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-
57302). 
61 See Alison Frankel, Kozinski Amends Opinion in 9th Circuit ‘Innocence’ Case v. Google, 
REUTERS (July 15, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2014/07/15/kozinski-
amends-opinion-in-9th-circuit-innocence-case-v-google/ [http://perma.cc/53DH-2F4T]. 
62 See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 935. 
63 For example, Judge Smith added a quote from the case Winter v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). See Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 948–49 (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
64 See, e.g., Corynne McSherry, Bad Facts, Really Bad Law: Court Orders Google to 
Censor Controversial Video Based on Spurious Copyright Claim, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/bad-facts-really-bad-
law-court-orders-google-censor-controversial-video-based [http://perma.cc/NZ7A-
XVR8] (arguing that Garcia’s copyright claim is questionable and that an injunction that 
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distributors and Internet publishers would not have the resources 
or the capability to determine whether an actor had a copyright in-
terest in their own performance in a film.65 Critics were concerned 
that Internet publishers may be forced to err on the side of those 
asserting their copyright rights, chilling more speech than should 
have to be removed, and placing a burden on websites that do not 
have the resources or the skills to remove content from their sites. 
Other critics addressed the potential effect the ruling may have 
on the entertainment industry, especially the effect on small-
budget amateur films or documentaries.66 There was also concern 
for the potential effect on films where the lines of consent might be 
murky, for example where documentaries mislead their subjects in 
order to create their art.67 In addition, there might be a heavier re-
liance on contracts for actors in the future; even though critics are 
currently concerned with the fact that movies generally do not con-
tract with actors who played miniscule roles in the film. Movies 
with extremely large casts would have difficulty keeping track of all 
the actors who could claim a copyright in their performance.68 The 
court attempted to address this problem in the amended opinion by 
stating that these problems would rarely occur since “the vast ma-
jority of films are covered by contract, the work for hire doctrine, 
or implied licenses.”69 
However, Judge Kozinski is not without his supporters. For ex-
ample, some have argued that the Garcia I decision is legally cor-
                                                                                                                            
suppresses speech should be heavily scrutinized); Schuyler M. Moore, Garcia v. Google: 
Hard Cases Make Bad Law, HUFFINGTON POST (May 5, 2014), http://www.huffington 
post.com/schuyler-m-moore/garcia-v-google-hard-case_b_4900376.html 
[http://perma.cc/D26Q-M3JR] (arguing the holding was wrong and the court should 
have used right of publicity); Tushnet, supra note 29. 
65 Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 60, at 38. 
66 Id. 
67 See Roger Parloff, 11 Judges to Rehear Case Between Google and Actress with Fatwa on 
Her Head, FORTUNE (Dec. 11, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/12/11/google-appeals-in-
fatwa-case/ [http://perma.cc/TSF5-PCGA]; see also Jonathan Handel, Hollywood Experts 
Divided on Implications of ‘Muslims’ Ruling, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 28, 2014), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/hollywood-experts-divided-implications-
muslims-684607 [http://perma.cc/TV33-CLB4]. 
68 See Garcia II, 786 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (using Lord of the Rings as 
an example of a movie that has twenty thousand extras). 
69 Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
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rect or that, given the unusual fact pattern, the ruling ultimately 
created the best outcome.70 Actor and musician associations, in 
particular, expressed their approval, as these associations support 
the protection of actors’ originality.71 
Both sides were given an opportunity to set forth their positions 
when Google petitioned for a rehearing en banc.72 Twelve amicus 
briefs were submitted in support for or opposition to the rehearing, 
including briefs by Netflix,73 Adobe,74 News Organizations,75 intel-
lectual property law professors,76 and the Screen Actors Guild.77 
D. Garcia II 
In November 2012, the court granted Google’s petition for a 
rehearing en banc.78 Oral arguments were held on December 15, 
2014 in front of a panel of eleven Ninth Circuit federal judges, and 
in May 2015 an opinion was issued.79 The en banc court affirmed 
                                                                                                                            
70 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Copyright Meets “Innocence Of Muslims”: Ninth Circuit 
Orders Removal of Movie from YouTube, on Copyright Grounds, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/26/ 
copyright-meets-innocence-of-muslims-ninth-circuit-orders-removal-of-movie-from-
youtube-on-copyright-grounds/ [http://perma.cc/7MQS-QY7X] (agreeing with the 
majority opinion, but arguing that Google has a fair use defense); see also Handel, supra 
note 67 (interviewing several law professors and entertainment lawyers who agree with 
the ruling). 
71 See generally Bill Chappell, Google Wins Copyright and Speech Case over ‘Innocence Of 
Muslims’ Video, NPR (May 18, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/ 
05/18/407732594/google-wins-copyright-and-speech-case-over-innocence-of-muslims-
video [http://perma.cc/NL84-XB5K]. 
72 Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302). 
73 Brief for Netflix, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees, Garcia I, 
766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302) (arguing the reworking of copyright law hurts Netflix and 
other similar distributors). 
74 Brief for Adobe Systems et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees, 
Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302) (arguing the holding burdens online services and 
third-party distributors). 
75 Brief for News Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees, 
Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302) (discussing First Amendment implications). 
76 Brief for Professors of Intellectual Property Law as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Defendants-Appellees, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302) (addressing the court’s use 
of copyright law). 
77 Brief for Screen Actors Guild et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302). 
78 See Order Granting En Banc Rehearing, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302). 
79 Id.; see also Garcia II, 786 F.3d 733, 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
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the district court’s opinion, holding that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a mandatory injunc-
tion.80 
The majority wrote: “In this case, a heartfelt plea for personal 
protection is juxtaposed with the limits of copyright law and fun-
damental principles of free speech. The appeal teaches a simple 
lesson—a weak copyright claim cannot justify censorship in the 
guise of authorship.”81 The majority went on to point out that Gar-
cia did not have a copyright claim because her performance was not 
fixed in a tangible medium, rather it is the role of the filmmaker to 
create the fixation of the performance.82 
The majority also addressed the issue of irreparable harm.83 
The majority stated that Garcia had not demonstrated that she had 
suffered an irreparable harm as she had delayed before she sought 
an injunction.84 Additionally, any harm she had suffered “did not 
stem from copyright”85 and “Garcia’s harms are too attenuated 
from the purpose of copyright.”86 This time Judge Kozinski, the 
author of the original majority opinion, dissented and reiterated 
much of his original opinion.87 
II. GARCIA’S POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE LEGAL OPTIONS 
Garcia initially began her lawsuit in state court, where she did 
not bring any claims under copyright law.88 Garcia, in her com-
plaint filed in district court, brought claims of: copyright infringe-
ment, fraud, unfair business practices, libel, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.89 She left out a claim of right of publicity 
                                                                                                                            
80 Id. at 734. 
81 Id. at 736. 
82 See id. at 740–41. 
83 See id. at 744–46. 
84 See id. at 746. 
85 Id. at 744. 
86 Id. at 746. 
87 See id. at 749–53 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
88 Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. BC492358 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2012). 
89 Complaint, Garcia v. Nakoula, No. 12-cv-08315-MWF-VBK (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 
2012). 
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(which she had previously included in her complaint filed in state 
court).90 
Garcia’s choice to file a copyright lawsuit in federal court was 
strategic for a number of reasons. Yet, she should have filed a law-
suit in state court on tort claims, such as fraud. She would have had 
a high likelihood of success based on the facts of the case and the 
sympathy the court has expressed for her extremely unfortunate 
situation thus far.91 The issue, however, is that the relief she re-
ceived in federal court may not be the same or even similar to what 
she would have received in state court. This Part will discuss why 
Garcia pursued a copyright claim by addressing what type of relief 
Garcia might want, what types of potential legal methods were 
available to her, and how said legal methods act within the frame-
work of copyright law. 
A. What Relief Does Garcia Want? 
As was made clear by her request for a temporary restraining 
order, Garcia wanted the film removed from YouTube.92 Yet, by 
bringing a lawsuit against Youssef alone, there are different types of 
relief Garcia could seek and these goals would affect how she 
shapes her lawsuit. 
First and foremost, Garcia wanted the video taken off the In-
ternet and completely prevented from being re-uploaded. Google 
argued that it would be impossible to comply with the order.93 The 
Ninth Circuit took some steps to prevent rush downloading of the 
film by prohibiting publication of the injunction.94 However, 
Google also noted in its brief that the film is available on other vid-
eo hosting websites and “those who wish to proliferate the film 
have ample copies to work from.”95 Even the district court felt that 
                                                                                                                            
90 Complaint, supra note 88. Garcia voluntarily withdrew her lawsuit in California state 
court after a judge found she had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. 
91 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 64 (stating that judges sometimes “rule with their 
hearts”). 
92 See Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
93 Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 60, at 12. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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Garcia waited too long before bringing suit to prevent harm.96 That 
being said, the amount of influence YouTube has, as one of the 
largest websites, cannot be ignored.97 Therefore, only removing it 
from that platform would still have a great effect. 
Reaching a defendant like Youssef might prove to be more dif-
ficult. Youssef goes by multiple aliases and constantly changes his 
name.98 At the time the lawsuit began, he was in prison for violat-
ing parole on a prior conviction for bank fraud.99 Youssef had al-
ready allegedly spent $80,000 on Innocence of Muslims, which he 
received from ex-family members and donations.100 A plaintiff 
should consider a cost-benefit analysis before going through the 
expense and trials of a lawsuit, with regards to what the potential 
rewards might be with respects to a potential defendant. 
Another incentive to bringing a lawsuit is the possibility of re-
pairing Garcia’s reputation. By coming forward and bringing the 
lawsuit, Garcia can publicly denounce and distance herself from 
the film and its violence towards Islam. She was one of the few ac-
tors in the film to come out publicly against the film; other actors 
went into hiding.101 These lawsuits could be more about declaring 
her innocence than fighting copyright infringement.102 Judge Ko-
zinski, in his opinion, discussed the importance of Garcia disasso-
ciating herself from the film’s message.103 
In discussing the type of relief Garcia might want, it is also 
worth noting the type of injunction that was originally issued. The 
court directed Google to “take down all copies of Innocence of Mus-
lims from YouTube and any other platforms within its control and 
to take all reasonable steps to prevent further uploads.”104 As a re-
sult, Google will have to patrol its sites to ensure that the film 
                                                                                                                            
96 Garcia I, 766 F.3d at 947 (Smith, J. dissenting). 
97 See id. at 938–39 (majority opinion) (arguing that YouTube is so prominent that 
removing it from the platform will curb the harm). 
98 See Kovaleski & Barnes, supra note 6. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See Gross, supra note 4. 
102 See id. 
103 Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
104 See id. at 940. 
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would not be uploaded in the future. It is unlikely that Garcia 
would receive as broad a mandatory injunction against Youssef as 
she received against Google. Google has the resources to comply 
with that injunction and Youssef does not. If Garcia were to con-
vince a court to transfer the film’s copyright interest to her as a 
remedy, she would still have to submit DMCA takedown notic-
es.105 Where, as here, it appears that the burden is on Google to 
keep the film off its platforms. 
It is also worth addressing here the relationship between a 
broad injunction order, like the one in Garcia I, and the role of the 
safe harbor provisions of the DMCA, discussed below.106 Some 
might argue that the purpose of the DMCA takedown notice con-
struct was to put the takedown requests in the hands of those 
whose copyrights are being infringed.107 Thus, Judge Kozinski’s 
order might conflict with the DMCA.108 
B. Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Takedown Notices 
The DMCA, enacted in 1998, created safe harbors to protect 
Internet service providers (“ISP”) or online service providers from 
the liability of infringing content.109 Under the DMCA, an ISP is 
defined as a “provider of online services or network access, or the 
operator of facilities therefor.”110 The DMCA was created to 
“provide certainty for copyright owners and Internet service pro-
viders with respect to copyright infringement liability online.”111 
The notice and takedown provision in the DMCA creates a safe 
harbor for ISPs. In order to be exempt from liability, an ISP is re-
quired to respond “expeditiously” “to notices of copyright in-
fringement by removing hosted content, or links to content, when 
                                                                                                                            
105 See infra Part II.B. for a discussion on DMCA takedown notices. 
106 See infra notes 109–17. 
107 See Parloff, supra note 67. 
108 See id. 
109 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010); Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233 (2009). It also criminalized technology created to circumvent 
measures that control access to digital content (digital rights management). 
110 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(B). 
111 See Lee, supra note 109, at 243. 
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they receive a notice alleging copyright infringement.”112 Addition-
ally, there is a condition that the ISP must not have actual or con-
structive knowledge of the infringement before receiving the no-
tice.113 Therefore, companies, like Google, must adhere to guide-
lines and create policies that quickly block access to or remove in-
fringing material once they receive notice from a copyright hold-
er.114 
Submitting a takedown notice is a useful method for a victim of 
copyright infringement to protect her copyrights without having to 
seek legal advice, especially if she has not registered the copyright 
with the Copyright Office before the infringement occurred. A 
DMCA takedown request does not require the content to be copy-
righted in order to process the takedown.115 
However, the process is not without its complications. Simply 
put, once a copyright owner has found infringing material, she 
submits a takedown notice to the ISP identifying the infringing 
work.116 If the alleged infringer feels that he was using the work le-
gally or that the removal was a mistake, the infringer can submit a 
counter notice to the ISP and the ISP will repost the work.117 At 
that point, the copyright owner’s only recourse is to file a lawsuit 
asking the court for an injunction.118 
C. Garcia Should Have Pursued a Tort Claim in State Court 
If Garcia decided not to bring a copyright infringement claim 
against Youssef and Google in federal court, she could have at-
tempted to bring a lawsuit against Youssef in state court for tort 
                                                                                                                            
112 Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects?” Takedown 
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 624 (2006); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). 
113 § 512(c)(1). 
114 See Lee, supra note 109, at 233. 
115 What is a DMCA Takedown?, DMCA.COM, http://www.dmca.com/FAQ/What-is-
a-DMCA-Takedown [http://perma.cc/ACT7-E96K] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
116 See Carolyn E. Wright, Two Easy Steps for Using the DMCA Takedown Notice to Battle 
Copyright Infringement, NAT’L PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASS’N, https://nppa.org/page/ 
5617 [http://perma.cc/F262-TKWK] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
117 See id. 
118 See id. 
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claims. Those claims would most likely be fraud, right of publicity, 
invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Generally, the standard for granting a preliminary injunction is 
“the likelihood the moving party ultimately will prevail on the me-
rits, and the relative interim harm to the parties from the issuance 
or nonissuance of the injunction.”119 Garcia’s best hope would be 
to have the court grant a preliminary injunction, forcing Youssef to 
both remove the videos he uploaded and prohibiting him from dis-
tributing the film in the future. If Garcia prevailed in a tort lawsuit, 
the court might also be able to grant Garcia the copyright interest 
in the work, which ultimately would give her the opportunity (or 
the burden) to submit DMCA takedown requests where she saw 
fit. 
D. Issues Created from Suing Youssef Alone 
If Garcia were able to receive a court injunction against Youssef 
alone for a tort claim, such as emotional distress, in state court, she 
would be unable to apply the injunction directly against Google or 
any content-hosting website. This is significant because it would be 
most efficient to go straight to the website that hosts the video in 
order to get it removed. Or, alternatively, the person against whom 
the injunction is sought might violate the court’s orders. However, 
for the following reasons, it is important to note that simply be-
cause Youssef receives an order by the court requiring him to take 
down the video, does not mean Google or any other content-
hosting website has to comply with that order. 
1. Google Not Liable Under Section 230 
Google, as an online host, is not liable for the third-party con-
tent provided by the creator or speaker; here, defendant Youssef.120 
The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C § 230, states that 
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
                                                                                                                            
119 See Hunt v. Superior Court, 987 P.2d 705, 716 (Cal. 1999). 
120 See generally Brief for Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, 
Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-57302); see also Brief for Floor64, Inc. and 
Organization for Transformative Works as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-
Appellees, Garcia I, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302). While the court did not directly address 
section 230, many of the amicus briefs felt that its ruling may greatly affect the statute. 
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treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.”121 Therefore, the provider 
of an “interactive computer service” that publishes information, 
but is not the provider of the information content, cannot be held 
liable for the resulting tort.122 Congress’ goal in enacting sec-
tion 230 was to “promote the free exchange of information and 
ideas over the Internet” and to encourage online hosts to police 
themselves.123 The Act’s purpose was to protect online Internet 
publishers and social networks from those limiting free expression. 
Here, Youssef willingly provided the content (the film) and, there-
fore, Google should receive full immunity.124 
However, section 230 does not provide immunity to ISPs from 
“laws pertaining to intellectual property.”125 Therefore, while 
Google would have immunity against not removing defamatory or 
fraudulent claims, for example, it only has this protection against 
non-intellectual property claims.126 This is seemingly an important 
reason Garcia chose to pursue a copyright lawsuit in federal court 
in order to bring Google into the lawsuit.127 Presumably, if Garcia 
had attempted to bring a non-intellectual property claim against 
Google, it would have been blocked by section 230.128 
2. Enforcing an Injunction Against a Third-Party 
Blockowicz v. Williams demonstrated that an Internet publisher 
website cannot be compelled to remove material by an injunction 
that was issued in a proceeding where the publisher was not a par-
ty.129 The Blockowiczs had secured an injunction against defen-
dants requiring them to remove defamatory statements from sever-
                                                                                                                            
121 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2010). 
122 See Ken S. Meyers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to 
Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163, 178 (2006). 
123 See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003). 
124 See id. at 1124. 
125 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). 
126 Id. 
127 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007). 
128 See Brief for Internet Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-
Appellees, supra note 76. Perfect 10 also states that section 230’s reference to “intellectual 
property” only means “federal intellectual property.” Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119. 
129 See Blockowicz v. Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 564 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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al websites, but defendants never responded.130 Every website re-
moved the statements except for www.ripoffreport.com operated 
by Xcentric.131 The plaintiffs asked the court to compel Xcentric to 
remove the statements by enforcing the injunction against Xcentric 
through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2)(C).132 The 
Blockowiczs could not sue Xcentric directly because of section 230 
immunity. Rule 65(d)(2)(C) allows courts to enforce injunctions 
against “third parties who have ‘actual notice’ of the injunction, 
and ‘who are in active concert or participation’ with the parties 
bound by the injunction.”133 The court held that Xcentric does not 
fit within Rule 65(d)(2)(c) because actions that aid and abet must 
occur after the injunction is imposed so nonparties have “actual 
notice” of the injunction.134 The court also noted in its opinion that 
the Blockowiczs’s only relief may be a contempt charge against the 
original defendants for not complying with the injunction, and that 
it would not be possible to enforce an injunction against Xcentric in 
this way.135 Garcia I and Garcia II are similar to Blockowicz, in that 
Garcia, if she received an injunction solely against Youssef, would 
be unable to enforce the injunction against Google.  
E. Websites Voluntarily Removing Content and Complying With 
Injunctions 
Most online Internet publishers are generally willing to remove 
infringing content when a court orders an injunction against the 
content creator on its own accord.136 If the court had ruled that 
Youssef needed to take the film down, it is likely that Google may 
have assisted Garcia if she had run into any serious problems de-
spite no legal authority requiring them to do so.137 Google has a 
webpage where it assists users with submitting legal removal re-
quests, injunctions, and other documents because of content that 
                                                                                                                            
130 See id. at 565. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. at 567. 
133 Id. at 567. 
134 See id. at 568. 
135 See id. at 569–70. 
136 See generally Blockowicz, 630 F.3d 563 (noting where all other websites removed 
content when the defendants did not comply with the injunction). 
137 See Brief for Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 
120. 
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either violates their terms of service or the law.138 Google’s deci-
sion to block access to the video in Egypt and Libya (without com-
pletely removing it from their website) could be viewed positively 
in that Google was willing to stop the screening of offensive ma-
terial by minimizing viewership of the video.139 
On the other hand, Google’s decision to take down the materi-
al, unless it comes directly from a court order is purely discretio-
nary. Innocence of Muslims was removed only in response to vi-
olence and the company said its decision was unusual and “made 
because of the exceptional circumstances.”140 Notably, Google had 
determined the video “was not hate speech.”141 Ultimately, 
Google wants to do what is best in order to protect free speech, 
while simultaneously acting in the best interest of the company. In 
response to the protests over the video, Eric Schmidt, Google’s 
chairman, said: “Google has a fairly clear view of this, which is that 
we believe that the answer to bad speech is more speech.”142 
Where Google is defining what hate speech is (speech against indi-
viduals, not against groups)143 and protecting itself and its users 
from censorship, there will be situations where content that should 
be removed, will not be because of section 230. No plaintiff can 
safely rely on an Internet publisher to remove all content voluntari-
ly. 
                                                                                                                            
138 Legal Removal Requests, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/legal/answer/3110420 
?hl=en [http://perma.cc/JDE5-3MM2] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
139 See Brief for Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note 
120; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2010); Claire Cain Miller, As Violence Spreads in Arab 
World, Google Blocks Inflammatory Video in Egypt and Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2012), 
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140 Miller, supra note 139. 
141 Id. 
142 See Google’s Eric Schmidt Defends YouTube for Hosting Anti-Islam Film, DAILY 
MOTION (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xtx4he_google-s-eric-
schmidt-defends-youtube-for-hosting-anti-islam-film_news [http://perma.cc/5UEV-
AUX7] [hereinafter Eric Schmidt Defends YouTube]. 
143 Miller, supra note 139. 
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III. BEYOND GARCIA I AND GARCIA II: THE CURRENT 
LANDSCAPE 
The goal of copyright is to give authors an incentive to create144 
by rewarding certain authors for their creations with exclusive en-
forceable rights. As in Garcia I, copyright is increasingly being used 
for the purpose of removing content from the Internet, when the 
plaintiff disagrees with or has been damaged by the content. Law-
suits that should be centered on claims of contract disputes trans-
form into copyright lawsuits. In Garcia I, the plaintiff was not mo-
tivated by the incentive to create; rather her lawsuit was based on 
“ex-post incentives to claim copyright.”145 Essentially, plaintiffs, 
like Garcia, are using federal copyright law as a workaround to 
avoid section 230 blocking state tort law claims. 
In Garcia II, the Ninth Circuit used the example of Bollea v. 
Gawker Media146 to demonstrate how plaintiffs pursue copyright 
claims to suppress derogatory material and not with the actual in-
tent of protecting their intellectual property rights.147 In Bollea, the 
wrestler Hulk Hogan sought an order requiring defendants to re-
move a sex tape from its website, claiming copyright infringement. 
The court held that the plaintiff “produced no evidence demon-
strating that he will suffer irreparable harm in the copyright sense 
absent a preliminary injunction.”148 Discussed below are several 
other examples that push the parameters of copyright. 
A. Using Copyright to Remove Content: Revenge Porn 
In August of 2014, hackers leaked hundreds of nude photo-
graphs of celebrities onto the Internet.149 The source of these pho-
                                                                                                                            
144 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
145 See Clark D. Asay, Ex Post Incentives and IP in Garcia v. Google and Beyond, 67 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 37, 41 (2014) (comparing ex-ante and ex-post incentives to create 
intellectual property and applying them to patent trolls). 
146 Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012). 
147 See Garcia II, 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Bollea, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 
1327. 
148 See Garcia II, 786 F.3d at 745 (quoting Bollea, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1329). 
149 See Dan Kedmey, Hackers Leak Explicit Photos of More Than 100 Celebrities, TIME 
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://time.com/3246562/hackers-jennifer-lawrence-cloud-data/ 
[http://perma.cc/RU2V-YBER] (noting that Jennifer Lawrence was one of the affected 
celebrities). 
484 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:463 
 
tos was believed to be a breach in Apple’s iCloud system, a service 
where users can store data remotely. The photos were initially up-
loaded to social networking websites and forum boards, such as 
4Chan and Reddit, and quickly spread across the Internet. If cele-
brities took the photos themselves, they could, as copyright holders 
of the photos, file DMCA takedown notices to possibly get the 
photos removed from the website. In the event that the attempt to 
have the photos removed through takedown notices is ignored, the 
celebrity could then bring a lawsuit in order to have the photo-
graphs taken down. 
While this strategy may be helpful in getting nude photographs 
and pornography removed from less reputable websites,150 there 
are several challenges celebrities may run up against while attempt-
ing to employ this legal strategy. For instance, celebrities may have 
to prove that they are the copyright holder of the picture, such as 
that he or she took the photo. Search engines like Google generally 
only remove URLs from the search engines when they receive a 
valid notice of copyright infringement.151 Also, once a celebrity 
does file a DMCA takedown notice and succeeds in removing the 
infringing photo from one website, another photo could still 
emerge on the same or another website.152 “Fighting this fire 
through DMCA is akin to playing digital whack-a-mole.”153 
Similarly, celebrities are not alone in experiencing the same 
frustration at being unable to find a legal method to have the nude 
photos or sexually explicit material removed from the Internet. 
                                                                                                                            
150 Kadeen Griffiths, Jennifer Lawrence’s Nude Pic Lawsuit Allegedly Hits a Copyright 
Snag That Will Horrify You, BUSTLE (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.bustle.com/articles/ 
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151 See Eric Gardner, Google Responds to Jennifer Lawrence Attorney’s $100 Million 
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TIME (Sept. 2, 2014), http://time.com/3256732/jennifer-lawrence-selfies-copyright/ 
[http://perma.cc/W4SV-REAJ]. 
153 Id. 
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“Nonconsensual pornography,” also known as “revenge porn,” is 
the “distribution of sexually graphic images of individuals without 
their consent.”154 Typically the images are created during an inti-
mate relationship, and then are later uploaded by ex-partners.155 
The victims may have more difficulty in asserting that the copy-
right in their photo or “selfie” was violated, due to the fact that 
non-celebrities do not have the same resources as celebrities to 
pursue a lawsuit and the types of websites that host revenge porn 
tend to ignore victims’ requests.156 However, many believe that 
DMCA takedown notices are a good tool for victims to force web-
sites that specialize in hosting revenge porn to accept liability.157 
Some legal scholars have gone even further and suggested that 
victims of revenge porn should be joint “authors of their own per-
formances.”158 By making victims of revenge porn joint authors of 
their own performance, victims would be given a copyright interest 
in the photo and would avoid the problem of proving that they are, 
in fact, the copyright holder. However, this change would greatly 
change the meaning of “joint author” in copyright law, or other-
wise make revenge porn its own exception to section 230.159 
As of 2015, twenty-four states have passed some form of re-
venge porn legislation criminalizing revenge porn160 and establish-
                                                                                                                            
154 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
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156 See id. at 360. 
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ing penalties of jail time, fines, and restitution.161 Activists, such as 
Professor Mary Anne Franks, are helping to draft a federal criminal 
revenge porn law, which would specifically act as a workaround of 
section 230, because section 230 does not “trump federal criminal 
law.”162 Furthermore, once federal revenge porn law has been 
enacted, websites, like Google, would become liable.163 Still there 
are those who believe these laws may be overbroad and that the 
availability of tort law against the initial poster and copyright law 
against the website is a sufficient means of redress for victims.164 
Regardless, nonconsensual pornography has shown that copy-
right law has been useful to take down speech that should not be on 
the Internet. Obviously, nonconsensual pornography is an awful 
and emotionally damaging problem that needs to be solved. It has 
to be asked, however, whether copyright is the best means to aid 
victims, both celebrities and non-celebrities, or whether they 
should have another medium through which they can seek legal 
remedy. An alternative solution would be for more states to crimi-
nalize revenge porn or for section 230 to be adapted to allow great-
er flexibility for laws, such as privacy or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
B. Using Copyright to Remove Content: Suppression of “Negative” 
Information 
Often individuals want certain data removed from the Internet 
that they feel violates their privacy, is untrue or wrong, or is defa-
matory. The data might be information that hurts the individual 
from attaining employment, private images that he or she did not 
want shared,165 or past criminal convictions. Regularly, businesses 
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want to remove content from websites that criticize their products 
and services because it is hurting their reputation.166 Businesses 
blame consumer-review websites, such as Yelp, for dips in profits 
and sales when they receive negative reviews. Sometimes negative 
reviews are bad for businesses.167 Yelp attracts around 120 million 
visitors a month and has more than 50 million customer-generated 
reviews.168 
Section 230 protects certain consumer review websites, like 
Yelp, from defamatory and untrue statements made by users.169 
Therefore, these businesses may be forced to go after the individu-
als themselves, many of whom are anonymous, in order to remove 
defamatory posts. Yelp receives six subpoenas monthly, some of 
which require the website to turn over the true identities of ano-
nymous reviewers.170 When a lawsuit is filed, the business rarely 
wins the lawsuits against a consumer over a defamatory review.171 
Businesses have used copyright law against a website to bring 
down a negative post. Sometimes they claim that the poster has 
misappropriated their intellectual property (something from their 
website, press release, or photo) into their post and they want the 
post taken down. While this might work against a large company 
processing thousands of DMCA copyright requests,172 it will likely 
not work in front of a federal judge who understands a fair use de-
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fense.173 For example, in order to work around section 230, one 
business attempted to have consumers sign over their intellectual 
property rights in their potential future consumer reviews. Medical 
Justice provided doctors and dentists, like Dr. Ken Cirka, with a 
“mutual privacy agreement.”174 The form had “patients waive 
their rights to post online reviews of the doctor”175 in exchange for 
greater privacy protection from the doctors. Dr. Circka was unable 
to remove a negative post directly from Yelp despite the agree-
ment176 and his assertions that he owned a copyright interest in the 
post. Medical Justice, as well, hasn’t been successful with its “ex 
ante customer gag order.”177 
Businesses are attempting to suppress information as consumer 
reviewing websites like Yelp become more popular. Forcing a con-
sumer or a patient to sign over her intellectual property right is un-
ethical because it chills speech and a consumer or patient may feel 
it is the only way for her to receive exceptional service or care. 
However, similar to the above mentioned revenge porn victims, it 
may be a useful tool for an individual who needs a defamatory re-
view removed from a website and has run out of legal options. 
C. Potential Solutions 
Some might say that creating a copyright infringement claim 
instead of using state tort law is an abuse of copyright law and an 
extreme method for silencing free speech that violates First 
Amendment rights. Others might argue that copyright law is a use-
ful tool for victims who can find no other legal alternative. Regard-
less, plaintiffs, like Garcia, should still have the means to bring the 
appropriate lawsuit and pursue remedies. Alternative legal me-
thods exist that may provide these individuals relief if pursued. 
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However, the benefits of implementing a new statute or industry 
standard must be weighed against the harms. 
First, states individually could create their own criminal laws, 
targeting the individuals responsible for the individual harm. For 
example, states are increasingly introducing bills to make posting 
revenge porn a felony.178 This would take the burden away from the 
Internet publisher and could more effectively deter culprits.179 
Additionally, Internet publishers and ISPs could be forced to 
listen more closely to the demands of their users as to what they are 
and are not allowed to publish. For example, the European Union 
developed the “right to be forgotten” which, in theory, allows an 
individual to remove data in order to control one’s image or one’s 
privacy.180 Internet publishers could delete unflattering photos or 
newspaper articles containing information of old criminal arrests in 
response to requests.181 This puts the burden on websites to cor-
rectly approve and remove requests, but also has the potential to 
chill speech.182 Conversely, we could also encourage more speech, 
in order to drown out the offending speech.183 
Intellectual property rights law, itself, could be stretched to in-
clude these extremely rare, special cases and violations. In Garcia I, 
there existed a tension between the Copyright Office asserting that 
an actor cannot be an author in her performance and the majority 
court arguing the opposite.184 If we allow for this wiggle room, then 
actors and victims, like Garcia, would not be taken advantage off. 
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Even Judge Kozinski found that this would rarely occur,185 so this 
type of legal argument would not be able to be used very often. On 
the other hand, the court has to consider the can of worms it might 
open by tweaking definitions within copyright law and the types of 
new claims others may bring. It might be difficult to draw a line in 
order to find what types of plaintiffs can find relief in copyright law. 
During the oral arguments, Judge Kozinski introduced the idea 
that the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances186 could be a 
solution. “The treaty endows performers with exclusive rights over 
when and how their recorded performances can be copied, distri-
buted or otherwise made available to the public,” as well as provid-
ing moral rights.187 While it may give Garcia a copyright in her per-
formance, however, the treaty has yet to be ratified or become ef-
fective.188 
Lastly, another option is that plaintiffs could be granted strong-
er arguments or claims when bringing lawsuits enforcing other 
rights. For example, victims could be allowed to have a stronger 
claim when they bring lawsuits claiming that they have suffered an 
invasion of privacy.189 
CONCLUSION 
With the growing expansion of the Internet, individuals are 
more often finding themselves unable to control their presence on-
line. As demonstrated by the dissemination of non-consenting, ex-
plicit photographs of women being posted online, which became 
newsworthy in 2014 when celebrities were affected. Similarly, 
businesses have been attempting to control their reputations from 
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being affected by negative often anonymous, and potentially un-
true, online reviews. Likewise, in Garcia I, actors were deceived 
into playing roles in an anti-Islamic film.190 There are other exam-
ples, but these are a few prominent illustrations. 
In the absence of a law that directly provides plaintiffs or vic-
tims the relief they desire, such as the removal of the content from 
the Internet, individuals have increasingly turned to copyright law. 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act protects Internet 
publishers, such as Google, from the kinds of claims individuals 
could be bringing (defamation, privacy, fraud, right of publicity, 
etc.). However, individuals can still bring lawsuits alleging that 
their intellectual property rights were violated. It is the protection 
for Internet publishers that section 230 provides that directs the 
individuals to this legal strategy. 
Garcia should have pursued other legal methods in her lawsuit 
against Youssef, the film’s producer, and should not have initiated 
a copyright lawsuit against Google. The order to take down the film 
was broad. Garcia naturally would not get the exact same results 
against an individual as against a behemoth company like Google. 
Her lawsuit was understandable given the legal strategies that are 
available to her and similarly situated plaintiffs at the time. Howev-
er, her harm was one that would be better suited to a resolution by 
privacy law, not copyright law. 
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